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Summary findings
With the reccnt resurgence of interest in equity,  literature but has been drawn into question by recent
inequality, and growth, the possibility of a negative  studies using panel techniques.
relationship between inequality and economic growth  They find evidence that asset inequality - but not
has received renewed interest in the literature. Faced  income inequality - has a relatively large negative
with the prospect that high levels of inequality may  impact on growth.
persist and give rise to poverty traps, policymakers are  They also find that a highly unequal distribution of
paying more attention to the distributional implications  assets reduces the effectiveness of educational
of macroeconomic policies. Because high levels of  interventions.
inequality may hurt overall growth, policymakers are  This means that policymakers should be more
exploring measures to promote growth and equity at the  concerned about households' access to assets, and to the
same time.  opportunities associated with them, than about the
How the consequences of inequality are analyzed,  distribution of income.
along with the possible cures, depends partly on how  Long-term growth might be improved by measures to
inequality is measured.  prevent large jumps in asset inequality - possibly
Deininger and Olinto use assets (land) rather than  irreversible asset loss because of exogenous shocks -
income - and a GMM estimator - to examine the  and by policies to facilitate asset accumulation by the
robustness of the relationship between inequality and  poor.
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Introduction
There has recently been a resurgence of interest in issues relating to equity, inequality, and growth in the
development  literature. Inequality  is "back  on  the  agenda"  (Kanbur and Lustig  1999) both  in  the
theoretical debate and in discussions by policy-makers. A significant and growing theoretical literature
points towards the possibility of a negative relationship between inequality and economic growth (Piketty
1999), as well as the scope for persistence of high levels of inequality and poverty traps. Policy makers
and international institutions aim to "face up to inequality" (Interamerican Development Bank, 1998), to
pay greater attention to the distributional implications of traditional macro-economic policy advice, to
identify situations where high levels of inequality may hurt overall growth, and to explore measures that
would promote growth and equity at the same time (Tanzi and Chu 1998; Solimano,Aninat, and Birdsall
1999, Lundberg and Squire, 1999). Indeed, inequality has begun to enter the popular discussion and even
unconventional proposals such as a universal cash grant equal to the value of a college education to all
Americans, to be financed through a wealth-tax, receive serious discussion (Ackerman and Alstott, 1999).
Compared to the widespread concern, both at the theoretical and the policy level, about the possible
deleterious consequences of inequality, the empirical evidence advanced in favor or disfavor of such a
link is thin,  especially in two respects. First,  even though most of the theoretical models for  a  link
between distributional  issues and  economic growth are  based  on  households'  access to assets,  the
majority of the empirical "tests" of such a link relies on data concerning the distribution of (after tax)
income. Given that there are large differences even between different definitions of income inequality,
this may be inappropriate. More importantly, even if one finds a negative relationship between inequality
and subsequent growth, the resulting policy recommendations will differ depending on whether inequality
of income or inequality of assets is the underlying factor. In the latter case, policies to enhance growth
2should emphasize ex ante equality of opportunity. The range of options includes policies that increase
opportunities and  incentives for creation of new physical and human capital assets, better  definition,
enforcement, and protection of property rights to assets held by the poor, and possibly one-time measures
of redistribution.  If, by  contrast, income inequality causes low growth, more direct  redistribution of
current income or consumption might be called for.
Second, the  large majority of empirical analyses of inequality rely on cross-country, cross-sectional
evidence rather than analysis of panel data. Although the level of evidence to be obtained from cross-
country  regressions will  always be  limited,  many growth regressions reported  in the  literature  are
sensitive to  inclusion of region-specific dummies, pointing towards omitted variable bias. Even if the
results are robust, they can hardly be treated as structural estimates and may proxy, for example, for
country specific attributes such as history, factor endowments, and cultural factors. Indeed, use of better
data with repeat observations for any given country and application of panel data econometric methods
has, in some recent  studies, led to the disappearance of the traditional negative relationship between
income inequality and  economic growth. If true, this  would imply that  the whole gamut  of policy-
recommendations derived from the negative inequality-growth relationship could be spurious, that -at
least insofar as economic growth is concerned- there is no reason for policy-makers to worry, and that
attention should shift to promoting growth rather than worrying about distributional issues.
In this paper, we aim to address both of these problems. To be able to distinguish between asset and
income inequality, we use measures for both in our regressions, although the main emphasis is (in line
with theoretical discussions) on asset inequality. To address methodological concerns, we use panel data
econometric methods, applying the GMM estimator by Arrellano and Bover (1995).
There are two main results. Using a sample of 5-year averages for 60 countries (with a total of 300
observations), much larger than the standard in the inequality-growth literature, we find that initialasset
inequality, as measured by the land distribution, has a significant growth-reducing impact. In contrast to
much of the  inequality-growth literature -which  found a disturbing negative impact  of education on
subsequent growth- use of a measure of the economy's human capital stock reveals that higher levels of
human capital contribute positively to a  country's  growth. In addition, the  interaction between asset
inequality  and  a  country's  human  capital  stock  is  negative and  significantly  different  from  zero,
suggesting that policies to expand education will have less of an impact in countries where assets (and
with them access to entrepreneurial opportunities) are distributed in a highly unequal fashion.
To determine whether this result comes about only as a consequence of the correlation between asset and
income inequality and to ensure comparability with the literature on income inequality, we include the
distribution of both income and assets. While the coefficient on land inequality remains significant and
3negative,  income inequality has a positive sign, comparable to the  findings by  other  studies. Other
coefficients, in particular the negative sign of the interaction between asset inequality and education, do
not change substantively. This suggests not only that our results are robust across different samples but
also that inequality in the distribution of assets and income affect growth through different channels.
The evidence in support of a growth-reducing impact of asset inequality is of policy relevance in a
number  of  aspects.  First,  measures  of  deregulation  and  privatization  of  state  assets  can,  if  not
implemented carefully and accompanied by an appropriate regulatory framework, lead to large increases
in the inequality of asset distribution. For example, fire-sales of assets without an adequate regulatory
framework can, as in a number of Eastern European countries, lead to huge jumps  in inequality in a
relatively short period of time. Experience suggests that high levels of inequality are very difficult and
costly to reverse. Special care to prevent that implementation  of privatization policies will lead to possibly
permanent shifts in the distribution of assets may therefore be warranted.
Second, with  imperfect information and incomplete markets for risk  and insurance, the  danger for
irreversible asset-loss in response to temporary shocks is particularly acute for the poor in remote rural
areas. To the degree that they are unable to subsequently recoup such losses, the result of unexpected
disaster may be a permanent and irreversible shifts in the  asset distribution. Policies to improve the
functioning of financial markets and to establish safety nets during times of crises have the potential of
preventing a one-off shock from being translated into permanent increases in inequality and asset-loss by
vulnerable groups in the population. Our results suggest that such policy measures to reduce existing
capital market imperfections could be justified not only in terms of equity but also as a means to ensure
individuals' access to economic opportunities and thereby sustain an economy's potential for longer-term
growth.
Third, our results suggest that, especially in countries characterized by high levels of asset inequality,
redistribution of assets may be a policy option to be seriously considered. However, a long history of
failed attempts at expropriative redistribution of land all over the world illustrates that such a policy may
be  very costly and,  unless it aims at  a  comprehensive increase in the  asset base  of the  poor, not
sustainable. The costs included, in addition to administrative expenses,  the attenuation of property rights,
the difficulties to the functioning of regular markets, a reduction of incentives for investment and asset
accumulation, and often also an increase in social tension and political polarization.' Thus, although our
results provide support to asset redistribution as a means to enhance growth, emphasis needs to be on
building up the asset endowments (of both physical and human capital) of the poor and on instruments,
' While hard evidence is hard to come by, in many cases these costs appear to have more than outweighed the benefits from redistributive
measures  - and in some cases (e.g. in Chile) even led to their complete reversal.
4such as a land tax, that are in line with efforts to improve economic efficiency. Research on the costs and
benefits of specific redistributive measures would be very desirable but, in order to yield  meaningful
results, will have to be conducted at the micro level rather than in a cross-country perspective.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides the conceptual background by reviewing the
basis for a link between inequality and growth, the empirically testable hypotheses that emerge, and the
empirical  evidence regarding these  hypotheses. Section three  discusses the  empirical  approach, the
econometric methodology and estimation strategy, the choice of variables and  data, and key  results
obtained. Section four concludes by highlighting areas for further research concerning measures of asset
inequality and the channels through which the effect may be transmitted, and possible policy implications.
2. Inequality and growth: Theoretical basis and empirical evidence
We motivate the paper by providing a brief oVerview  of the theoretical and empirical literature that has
investigated links between income or asset inequality and growth. This illustrates that, in addition to
being subject to problems of possible endogeneity, the emphasis on income distribution in the empirical
literature may not be in line with theoretical models that are framed almost exclusively in terms of the
distribution of assets. We then review the empirical evidence for a inequality-growth link, focusing in
particular on the differences between cross sectional and panel data approaches.
2.1 Theoretical links
Depending on  the  main mechanism at  work, one  can distinguish three  classes of  inequality-growth
models.  In redistributive political  economy models, the only way  in which distribution  could affect
growth is through determining the pivotal "median voter" and the critical link is through the impact of
such politically motivated redistribution on investment and the evolution of the economy's capital stock.
In models with capital market imperfections, credit constraints will prevent the poor from undertaking
profitable indivisible investments, implying that a more egalitarian initialasset distribution will result in
higher  aggregate  investment  and  formation  of  physical  or  human  capital.  If  combined  with
intergenerational mobility (or the lack thereof) or the possibility for voluntary public good provision at
the local level, this can lead to poverty traps and permanent social stratification. Finally, the distribution
of assets can, through its impact on economic efficiency or social stability, affect the cost of market
exchange, incentives to  invest, societies'  ability to respond to exogenous shocks in a coordinated and
effective way, and levels of violence.
2.1.1 Political economy models
5Much of the early literature on inequality and growth relied on political decision-making mechanism of
majority voting as the main process to generate a systematic link between inequality and growth (Persson
and  Tabellini,  1994, Alesina  and Rodrik  1994). The underlying  idea is  that  if,  under  an unequal
distribution  of  income or  wealth, the  (myopic) median  voter will  derive  short  term  gains  from a
redistribution from capital towards labor, she will approve such a measure, even though this will result in
lower long term growth. In societies where resources are distributed in a more egalitarian fashion, such
incentives for redistribution will not arise (the median voter would hurt herself) and therefore capital
accumulation and growth will be higher.
There may, however, be two problems with this argument. First, the empirical conclusion can easily be
reversed if, rather than being spent on consumption,  tax revenue is used to invest in productive pursuits or
public goods (infrastructure, law and order, secure property rights, education, etc.) that would not have
been financed otherwise. If this is the case, the impact of inequality on individuals' voting behavior and
the net effect of taxation will be more difficult to predict (e.g., Bertola, 1993, Cooper 1998, and Saint Paul
and Verdier  1994). The nature and use of taxation will, in  addition to the distribution of assets and
political power in society, depend on the nature of the extemality. This generates the scope for multiple
equilibria (Bourguignon and Verdier 1998) and discontinuities whereby and abrupt changes in inequality
occur as a  strategic move by the elite to avoid a revolution or costly political unrest (Acemoglu and
Robinson 1998). Among others, it would imply that the seemingly simple relationship between inequality
and growth through this channel no longer holds.
Two more practical problems affect the assumptions made in this class of models. On the  one hand,
individuals appear to be less myopic than implicitly assumed -even the prospect of upward mobility in
the income distribution can be shown to be a potent force that limits economic agents' desire to vote for
redistributive schemes (Benabou and Ok 1998). On the other hand, if there is indeed a lot of politically
motivated redistribution of resources within the economy, the data used in many empirical studies of this
issue - which are generally based on consumption rather than before tax income - will be endogenous. To
the degree that income inequality reflects the outcome of an economic process that  includes income
redistribution through taxes and public goods, it is not clear why a relationship should exist.
2.1.2 Credit market imperfections and indivisible investments
A second class of models establishing a systematic link between the distribution ofwealth and subsequent
growth based on credit market imperfections. The concept underlying this reasoning is straightforward:
Individuals are assumed to be able to engage in specific productive projects, the success probability of
which is private information. To ensure an adequate incentive structure on the part of borrowers, lenders
will demand collateral, leading to the emergence of equilibrium credit rationing. As a consequence, only
6entrepreneurs with sufficiently high levels of personal wealth will be able to finance their "project". With
a simple indivisibility, e.g. a fixed setup cost per project, the initial wealth distribution will determine
how many individuals will be able to undertake such projects as well as the equilibrium interest and wage
rate (Aghion and Bolton 1997).
One example for  such an indivisible investment is human capital. If education has to  be financed by
accessing capital markets, it can be shown that even among individuals with equal ability, those with
higher wealth may be able to become educated while the poor ones will not. In the presence of financial
market imperfections, countries with different distribution of wealth (and initial wealth level) will follow
different growth paths and may converge to different steady states (Galor and Zeira 1993). Depending on
the parameters of the model, the initial distribution of wealth can affect not only aggregate rates of growth
but  also  lead intergenerational persistence of  poverty and the  emergence of "poverty traps".  Thus,
redistribution  of wealth by  the  government could  improve productive efficiency,  enhance  aggregate
growth, and, if there are multiple equilibria, affect the economy's growth trajectory.
These models have a clear and testable empirical implication: If there is indeed a link between inequality
and investment through capital market imperfections, one would expect a negative relationship between
growth and the distribution of assets, but not necessarily the distribution of income. Instead, one should.
Furthermore, as the extent of credit rationing will depend on per capita income, this relationship should
become weaker as the economy grows richer.
2.1.2 Social stability, stratification, and violence
If accumulation of capital occurs at the local level (i.e. through local financing of public goods and
"neighborhood  effects"),  inequality can,  through endogenous stratification of  communities  and  the
ensuing differences in the level of public good provision, affect growth even if there are no credit market
imperfections. To generate such an effect, it is sufficient to have an externality from locally produced
public goods (Benabou 1994, Durlauf 1993). If, for example, quality of the educational system is a local
public good (and complementary to parents' own level of human capital), one will observe agents to sort
into communities that are differentiated by their wealth (or human capital) level. Such segregation which,
in addition, can be reinforced by traditional political mechanisms (e.g. voluntary contribution to school
financing, zoning  restrictions,  etc.),  can  lead  to  permanent divergence in  wealth  levels  and  some
communities being caught in poverty traps (Fernandez  and Rogerson, 1993; Durlauf 1994).
Inequality may affect growth not only because it reduces investment in local public goods or by capital-
constrained individuals. One example is the incentive-effects associated with  ownership of factors of
production, as most famously discussed in the literature on  sharecropping. A second element  is that
7inequality can create barriers that affect the cost of social interaction and economic exchange, e.g. through
ethnic homogeneity and social capital (Knaack and Keefer 1995; Temple 1998; Collier 1998). Finally,
inequality can be directly associated with the production of public "bads" such as violence and crime
which will affect economic growth through the direct damage created, the need to spend resources on
preventive activities, and the impact of the induced insecurity of property rights on investment incentives.
While  crime  and  violence is  a  multi-faceted phenomenon, an  increasing conceptual and  empirical
literature  links violence and  inequality. A  simple model of  crime  in this  sense yields the  intuitive
prediction that, for given social factors, only the poorest members of society will engage in criminal




Summaries of the empirical literature that tests relationships between income inequality and growth in a
cross section of countries are provided by Benabou (1996) and Perotti (1996). The majority of this
literature finds a negative impact of inequality on growth whereby a one standard deviation decrease in
inequality increases the annual growth rate of per capita GDP by between 0.5 to 0.8 points. This is too
little to account for the outstanding performance of East Asian economies, but it is clearly of relevance
and could lead to significant differences in longer-term  performance  across economies. Use of better data
that allow incorporation of panel aspects (using 5- or  10-year averages) suggests, however, that the
empirical relationship weakens considerably (and may actually be reversed). This led to fear that the
"empirical regularity" of a negative inequality-growth  relationship may be similar to the famous Kuznets
curve - very robust in a cross section but disappearing once country level fixed effects were introduced
(Fields and Jakubson 1994; Fishlow, 1995, Deininger and Squire 1998).
Forbes (1998) uses fixed effects, random effects, and the Arrellano-Bond estimator with 5-year periods
for 35 countries, generally obtaining a positive and significant relationship  between income inequality and
growth. This relationship is robust to variations in samnples,  inclusion of different variables or different
measures of inequality, and divisions of the sample by region, initial income, and other specification tests.
Similarly, Zou and Li (1998) find that the negative relationship  between inequality and growth disappears
in a panel context, for a sample of 35 countries with 5-year averages. Barro (1999) based on a panel
estimator  using  an  expanded sample 2 with ten-year averages, suggests that  the  negative impact of
2  He expands the data set by adding more obsevations getting 84 countries (or  146 observations) with  at least one observation for the Gini
coefficient.
8inequality on growth may depend on a country's wealth level, although even then the overall effects are
weak and the relationship lacks robustness.
However, other studies suggest that income inequality may have an impact on growth. Even though they
do not consider growth directly, Flug et al. 1998 use panel data to show that income inequality, lack of
financial markets, and to  some degree income volatility all  have a negative impact on  investment in
human capital, measured by secondary enrollment. Rodrik (1998) finds  that both inequality and  low
institutional  quality reduce societies'  ability to  effectively respond to  exogenous shocks. Fajinzilber,
Lederman, and Loyaza (1998), using panel data techniques, find a  significant impact of inequality on
crime, in addition to evidence for significant hysteresis and susceptibility  to temporal shocks. This can be
linked to  economic losses by noting that crime in Latin American countries leads to losses averaging
about 7.5% of GDP (Bourguignon 1998).
2.2.2 Asset inequality
There is some micro level evidence that the distribution of assets may matter more than the distribution of
income (which may, in addition, suffer from problems of endogeneity). Even in industrialized countries
where credit  market constraints should be less severe, initial distribution of assets  (as  measured by
inherited wealth) may be a key variable for individuals' ability to start up enterprises and climb up the
income distribution (Blanchflower and Oswald 1997; Bardhan et al.  1999). In China, Ravallion (1998)
finds a significant and negative effect of local asset distribution on individuals' consumption growth.
At  the country level, a number of recent contributions examine the  possibility that,  in  line with  the
theoretical models discussed above, it is less inequality of income but mal-distribution of assets that
causes reductions in countries' growth rates (e.g. Birdsall and Londono 1998, Deininger and Squire 1998,
Persson and Tabellini 1994). While they find support in favor of an impact of the asset distribution, the
evidence is largely based on cross-scctional rather than panel data evidence. Thus, due to differences in
data (income vs. asset distribution) and methods (cross-sectional versus panel), the empirical literature
has yielded ambiguous predictions regarding the presence, let alone the magnitude, of a possible impact
of inequality on growth. Below, we will investigate this issue using panel data techniques.
3. Data and econometric estimates
3.1 Estimation strategy
In the empirical analysis of the determinants of growth the following equation is conventionally specified:
(1  )  (yi, - Yi,-i)  = 63ji  ] + 13'x#,  + y'Zj + Si,
9where yi, denotes the logarithm of per-capita GDP of country i observed in period t, Xi,-, is a vector of
country-specific time-varying variables affecting growth, and Z, is a vector of country-specific time-
invariant variables that also affect GDP growth, and si, is an error term that captures the effects of time-
invariant and time-varying unobserved country characteristics. While  8 is a scalar parameter, 13  and y are
parameter vectors which are conformable with Xi,., and Z,, respectively.
As discussed above, the disturbance term ej, captures the effect of unobserved time-varying and time-
invariant country characteristics. Therefore, we specify the one-way error component model such that ei,
=  ui + ej,, where ui is a  country specific time-invariant effect and e,, is time-variant disturbance. We
assume that cov(ej,,u,)=O  and cov(e,,,e,j)=O,  for any t￿s.  Thus, (1) becomes:
(2)  (Yi,-yi,-,)  = 8yj,. + P'X-,  + y'Z,  + ui  + e11.
The OLS estimator of the parameters in (2) is likely to be biased and inconsistent for two reasons: First,
by construction,  yi,_l  is correlated with u; since:
(3)  (Yi,-l  -Y'v-2)  = 8YU-2  +  'Xi,- 2 + y'Z, + u, + ej,, 1,
and, after adding Yi,-2  to both sides of (3), we have:
(4)  y 11 i  = (8+l)Yh,  2  +  3Xj,,2  + Y'Z,  + u, + e, 1,
which implies thatyj, l is indeed correlated to the disturbance of (2) because of is correlation to the error
component u;  (even though e,, is white-noise).
Second, it is  likely that  some of the variables in  vectors X,,,  and Z,  are correlated with the  error
component u;.  For instance, as explained by Leamer et al. (1999), income and/or asset inequality is
correlated  to  factor  endowments, and  conditioned by  the  country-specific history  all  of which  are
unobservable characteristics measured by up.
With panel data, the usual solution to the lack of orthogonality between explanatory variables and the
error component u; is to  estimate the  specified parameters by applying OLS to the  "within groups"
transformation, or "first differencing", of both left- and right-hand-side variables in (2). In our case,
however, estimation of equation (2) via "fixed-effects" methods would create a number of new problems.
First, the first difference of yi,  ,--which  we define as AY,-, 1 YiO-1-Yi-2  is, by construction, correlated to the
first difference of e 1,, given by Aej,, eire,j,l.  Second, even though X-,l is uncorrelated, by assumption, to
the error component ej,, Xi, is likely to be contemporaneously correlated to eu,,  which implies that AXj,  l
will be correlated to Ae,,.  Therefore, the OLS estimator of 8 and ,B  obtained by regressing Ay 1, on Ayi,,l  and
10AXj,,l  will be biased and inconsistent. Finally, since the first difference ofZ 1 is zero, we would not be able
to identify the y's through fixed-effect estimation methods.
The last issue -i.e.,  the lack of identification of 7 when the within transformation is adopted-  can be
solved by employing the IV estimators proposed by  Hausman and Taylor (1981) and  Amemiya and
MaCurdy (1986), which were later generalized by Breusch, Mizon and  Schmidt (1989). For the  other
problems, i.e., the lack of orthogonality between Ay 1, 1l, AXj, 1, and the first differenced disturbance Aej,,,
which are inherent to dynamic panel data, Arellano and Bond (1991) formulate a consistent and unbiased
GMM estimator which uses twice lagged  y,, and Xi, as instruments. Building on this, Arellano and Bover
(1995) provide a unifying GMM framework that can be generalized for the estimation of Hausman and
Taylor-type  models,  as well  as  dynamic  panel  data models. Here we  adopt Arellano  and  Bover's
framework to compute a GMM estimator of 8, ,B  and y. This GMM estimator is based on two sets of
orthogonality conditions The first set relies on the orthogonality between Ae,,, and the  predetermined
variables Yif-2,Yii-3,  .., yi,, and Xi,2,Xi,3,. .., Xi.  The second set relies on the orthogonality between (u, + e;,)
and the first difference of the predetermined variables given by Ayi,-,,  Ayi,- 2, AYi,- 3,  *  .,AY, 2, and AXs-1,  AXs- 2,
AXj, 3,.  ..,AX,2,  in addition to orthogonality between (u; + ej,) and the strictly exogenous components of Zi,
here denoted by Z 1,. Note that for this GMM estimator to be feasible, 1h3 must hold, and hence, while yj,,
Y,2,  Xi,, and X, 2 are used as instruments, we cannot explore the orthogonality conditions fort=1 and 2. For
more details on how to compute this type of GMM estimator, see Arellano and Bover (1995).
3.2 Data issues
Despite the large amount of interest in inequality issues, empirical analysis of the topic in a developing
country context has, for all but a handful  of countries (e.g. India, Taiwan,  and Korea), been limited due to the
absence of appropriate  data. A number  of compilations  (with Jain 1975  being the most widely used) provide a
poor basis for making inferences on changes in inequality  over time. To provide a valid basis for inferences
on issues of changes in inequality over time as well as cross-country  comparisons  of inequality that involve
developing countries, data on income inequality should satisfy three basic criteria (Deininger and Squire
1996).
First, they  should be based on household surveys, rather than  estimates drawn from national accounts
statistics or administrative  records. While administrative  sources  may be acceptable in the case of developed
countries, both their quality and their coverage  varies widely in developing  countries and in the same country
over time. Use of such data can therefore create the illusion of changes in inequality  that are due only to the
11fact that administrative  coverage, the quality of reporting,-or  the method of imputing certain variables in
national accounts  changed. 3
Second,  measures  of inequality  should be based on comprehensive  coverage  of all sources of income or uses
of expenditure,  rather than covering, say, wages only. It is well known that income in kind (e.g. from home
production) is of particular importance  in developing  countries.  In African countries, for example, surveys
indicate that between 30-40% of income are from sources in kind rather than cash. To the degree that the
poor rely disproportionately  on income in kind, its neglect would lead to significantly overstate  inequality,
especially in African  countries.  Also omission  of non-cash  sources  of income can generate  the appearance  of
a spurious  decrease in inequality  as, in the process of development,  more and more households  participate  in
the formal economy. 4 Again, only use of a comprehensive  measure of income or expenditures allows to
overcome  this constraint.
Finally, inequality measures should be representative  of the population at the national level, rather than
dealing with only the rural or urban population,  or with  workers or taxpayers.' Restricting  attention  to wages
may be acceptable  in developed  economies  where  wage earners  comprise  the lion's share of the economically
active population.  Even then, inferences  on changes in inequality  over time may be biased if there are large
shifts in the composition  of income (e.g. increases  in the importance  of non-earned  income)  that can not be
easily corrected for. Things are more difficult in developing countries where a  significant share of the
population is  self  employed in  agriculture or  in  the  informal sector.  Policies  of  macro-economic
liberalization,  removal of anti-export  bias, and public sector  retrenchment  that have been undertaken  in many
developing countries generally have benefited the self-employed  and the rural sector, while hurting urban
bureaucrats  and wage earners.  Assessing the impact of such policies merely on the basis of wage earnings
may give rise to erroneous  conclusions.
The resulting  data set contains  at least one observation  on the Gini index for 108 countries  and information  on
shares  received  by different  quintiles in the population  for 103 countries  (Deininger  and Squire, 1996).  There
are 54 countries with four or more observations  and 32 countries with eight or more observations. This
allows  to go beyond comparison  of "growth  spells"  as in Fields and Jakubson  (1995) and Ravallion  (1995) as
well as the data used in the initial literature  on income inequality Persson  and Tabellini 1994; Alesina and
Rodrik 1994).
'This  leads to the exclusion of data such as Adelman and Morris  (1973), Ginneken and Park (1984), and Altimir (1986).
This could be part of the reason for the disappearance  of the Kuznets curve once better quality data are used (see Deininger and Squire 1998).
A more detailed  justification of these points, together with some examples,  is provided in Deininger and Squire (1996).
Rapid evolution in the number of household surveys available for developing countries since the data was established implies that both the
coverage and the quality of the data can be significantly expanded. As discussed  below, an update is currently under preparation.
12Although  this  signifies  a  considerable  improvement,  there  are  two  main  shortcomings.  First,
comparability of inequality indicators across countries (and in some cases even within the same country)
is limited by the fact that, in cases where unit record data were not available (or survey coverage was
limited), the data base contains differences in definition regarding three issues, namely whether (i) income
or expenditure are used to measure inequality; (ii) if income is used, whether it is measured gross or net of
taxes; and (iii) whether the household or the individual is the unit of observation. As more and more unit
record data become available, this will cease to be a serious problem and we refer to the description of the
original data-base for a more thorough discussion of these issues.
A second, and possibly more substantive, issue is that redistributing income is only one -and most likely a
relatively inefficient- way for governments to reduce undesirably high levels of inequality. In view of the
disincentive effects and problems of adverse selection that are associated with ex post  redistribution of
income, it has been argued that it may be more desirable for governments to be concerned about ex ante
equality of opportunity rather than ex post equalization of economic outcomes' Indeed, the literature has
long recognized  that it may be the distribution  of assets, rather than income,  that underlies a systematic effect
of inequality on growth, for example by restricting  access to credit markets and thus the ability to finance
productive but indivisible investments.  Nevertheless,  data on the distribution  of assets have rarely been used
in  empirical analysis. To partially remedy this  shortcoming, we  have assembled dkta on  the  initial
distribution  of operational holdings  of agricultural land  from the decennial FAO  World  Census  of
Agriculture 8 and other sources for 261 observations from 103 countries. The data suggest that-as  is the
case with other assets-the  distribution of land is more concentrated and characterized by greater cross-
country variation than that of income (with mean Gini coefficients of 63 and 37, and standard deviations
of 19 and 9, respectively).
Data on land holdings are attractive for a number of reasons. First, possession of land could be a major
determinant  of  individuals'  productive  capacity  and  their  ability  to  invest,  especially  in  agrarian
economies where land is a major asset. Second, in contrast to income, the measurement of which is often
associated with large errors, the distribution of land is relatively easily ascertained and does not require
assumptions regarding the mapping from income flows into stocks of assets. The available data, however,
refer to the operational rather than the ownership distribution of land. Nevertheless, we note that these
1 While a wide array of policies for (possibly targeted) provision of public goods is available to deal with such problems of structural  inequality
of opportunity, very little work has thus far been done to provide more systematic evidence across countries. The planned extension of the data
base will address this issue, thus contributing to what appears to be an interesting area for future investigation.
'  The data  are from FAO which compiles summaries of official "Agricultural  Censuses", conducted at the beginning of  each decade.  We
therefore do not have to deal with data problems of the kind encountered for income distribution data.
' Problems  may arise from the fact that aggregate  measures  of land distribution  do not adjust for soil quality or land improvements  (e.g.
irrigation),  rarely account  accurately  for land held under communal  tenure arrangements,  and that -especially  in regions  such as Sub-Saharan
Africa  where  population  density  is still  relatively  low-  land may  not have  scarcity  value.
13data constitute a lower bound for the latter in that the rental market generally seems to contribute to a
more equal distribution of land holdings.  Using these data we find that, indeed, the assumption of a one-to
one mapping from the distribution of income to the distribution of assets that has been used in much of
the  literature receives little empirical support-the  correlation between  the Gini coefficients for initial
distribution  of land and income is relatively  low (0.39). Finally,  coverage  is more equal both geographically
and over time than for data on income distribution.  In most cases observations  on land distribution are
available for earlier dates than estimates on income distribution  and for countries in which no nationally
representative  data on income inequality  are available.
To estimate the parameters of the growth equation (1) and the investment equation (2), we complement
the distributional data described above with measures of real GDP per capita (chain index) and the share
of investment in GDP are from the Summers-Heston (1995) data set as well as data on the per capita
human  capital stock are taken  from Nehru, Swanson, and  Dubey (1995) who utilize the  perpetual
inventory method to overcome some of the shortcomings associated with the use of enrollment figures as
a proxy for educational  attainment.
Time-varying variables used in the regressions are per capita GDP, the income Gini coefficients and the
measure of country and year specific educational stock. Time-invariant  variables included are initial Gini
coefficients for the initial (1960-1970) land ownership distribution.  Land ownership Gini coefficients are
assumed to be endogenous and therefore are not in the set ZlX  which thus contains only a vector of ones.
To attenuate the effect of missing data, the time-varying variables included in the growth equations are
measured in 5-year averages for the periods 1960-65, 1965-70, 1970-75, 1975-80, 1980-85  and 1985-90.
Table  1 shows  descriptive statistics by  region and  income category, following the  World Bank's
classification. Values in the "initial"  columns are for  1970-75, the first  5-year period for which an
equation is specified, as values for 1960-65  and 1965-70  are used only as instruments. Table 2 presents
actual initial and latest data for each country included in the regressions.
Based on the conceptual discussion above, we are interested in three main issues, namely
(i)  Whether inequality affects growth in a  reduced form specification with education and  land
inequality (plus interactions between education and lagged GDP as well as land inequality) as
right  hand side  variables. Results are in  tables  3 (for the  "full"  set)  and  4  (with income
inequality), respectively.
(ii)  To what degree a possible growth reducing impact of inequality comes through investment, i.e.
whether inclusion of investment in the above equations leads to the disappearance  of the negative
14sign on asset (or income) inequality. The relevant regressions include, in addition to the variables
used earlier, investment and interaction on the right hand side. Results are presented in table 5.
(iii)  Whether, apart from the impact of inequality on growth, one can discern an impact of inequality
on  investment -which  could be  interpreted as corresponding to  the  credit  market  channel
discussed earlier. Preliminary results for the applicable regressions  are presented in table 6.
For each regression, we present results for three models: Model I refers to the GMM estimates in which
Xi, is assumed to be contemporaneously  correlated to the time-varying disturbance  term e,, and therefore,
only twice lagged observations of X,, are included in the instrument set. Model II refers to the  GMM
estimates in which Xi, is assumed to be uncorrelated to the time-varying disturbance e,,, and therefore,
both lagged and future values of Xi, are included in the instrument set, as in Amemiya and MaCurdy
(1986) and Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt  (1989). Model III refers to the within or  fixed effects estimator.
While model I only requires the assumption of no serial correlation of the e 1, for consistency, model II
requires in addition lack of contemporaneous  correlation betweenXi, and ei,. Model III is inconsistent by
construction and  presented only for  sake of comparison. For each set of regressions, we  compute
Hausman test statistics to test the specifications of models II and III against the specification of model I.
Test statistics are given in the tables. In all of the cases, model II and III are rejected in favor of model I,
not surprisingly as model III is inconsistent by construction and the assumption ofX,, being uncorrelated
to ei,  appears to be very strong. Discussion of the results will therefore generally focus on the paraneter
estimates from model I.
3.3 Results and Discussion
Reduced form  growth  equation: In  the reduced form  (table  3,  equation  1), we  find  evidence for
conditional convergence, a negative impact of land inequality, and a positive and significant coefficient
for education. The positive coefficient on education is in contrast to many empirical studies, but in line
with results where a more adequate measure of the human capital stock is used (Freeman and Lindauer,
1999). The coefficient on the land Gini is not only highly significant but also comparatively large. To
illustrate its magnitudes, note that a reduction of about 10 percentage points in the land Gini of Brazil
would be equivalent to an increase of this country's human capital stock of 1.44 years (from 4.3 to about
5.7 years). Such a shift would leave Brazil still at 0.74 -with a distribution of land that is more unequal
than in Mexico (0.61) and in East Asian countries such as Korea (0.34).
While equation 1 suggests the presence of weak convergence  across countries, allowing for the fact that
the impact of education varies across income levels (by including an interaction termn  with the level of
15income) leads to  a  number of additional points of  interest. First,  it  suggests that  there  is actually
divergence for all countries below a minimum level of human capital stock (with a point estimate of about
6 years). Also, the negative sign of the coefficient on the interaction  between education and income points
towards greater effectiveness of additional investment in education in poor countries. Land inequality
remains negative and significantly  different from zero.
Adding an interaction between education and asset inequality (table 3, equation 3) suggests that high
inequality of asset ownership reduces the effectiveness of policies that aim to increase aggregate growth
through investment in education. At the same time, the coefficient on the land Gini becomes positive,
though insignificant. Evaluating the derivative of growth with respect to education suggests that greater
inequality in the asset distribution will reduce growth for all countries with a human capital stock above
1.53 (which is virtually everybody).
One question of relevance for the policy discussion is whether and to what degree the results obtained
thus far just  reflect the high correlation between land and income inequality, or whether these two
variables have indeed a differential impact on growth. Given the limited availability of high quality data
on income distribution, inclusion of the income Gini (table 4) into the reduced form equation reduces the
sample to 31 (dropping in particular almost all the African countries) with an average of 3.5 observations
per country. While magnitudes of coefficients change, land inequality remains significant. Indeed, signs
and significance of all the coefficients discussed earlier remain as discussed above (including a positive
effect of education, a negative impact of the interaction between education and income, and a significant
growth-reducing impact of asset inequality). In line with what has been found by other contributions to
the literature,  the coefficient on income inequality is positive and significant in two of the three equations.
Exploring the channels through which income and asset inequality could differentially affect growth
might be a promising area of study for further research.
Growth equation with investment: While, according to the theories discussed earlier, investment is likely
to be affected by inequality, it is of interest to examine to what degree inequality has an independent
effect, after levels of investment in physical capital are controlled for. Results reported in table 5 suggest
that inequality affects growth not only through investment but appears to have an independent impact on
efficiency of resource use. In all specifications  except equation 2, lagged investment and the economy's
human  capital stock appear as  highly significant determinants of  growth. The  interaction between
education and income indicates divergence of growth rates for countries with a human capital stock below
3.5 years and convergence  thereafter. Furthermore,  we find that the land Gini is significant and negative if
included on its own (equation 1) or in interaction  with human capital (equations 2 and 3).
16Further information would be needed to decide what is at the root of this phenomenon. One could think of
either an  "incentive effect" as discussed in the  sharecropping literature or a  "social capital effect"
whereby inequality would increase the cost of social and economic interaction, including the ability to
maintain rule of the law in an unbiased way. The issue, as well as the link between inequality and
investment, deserves further study.
4. Conclusion and areas for further research
While the link between income inequality and lower subsequent growth may indeed be tenuous (or even
opposite of what has been traditionally assumed), asset inequality appears to remain as a major causal
determinant of countries' growth performance even if panel data techniques are used. In addition to a
direct growth-reducing effect, high land ownership inequality also poses a limit to the effectiveness of
educational policies in contributing to aggregate growth, as indicated in our regressions by the negative
and  significant interaction between  inequality and  the  stock of  human  capital. Furthermore, asset
inequality appears to have a negative "incentive effect" that goes beyond the traditional channel of credit
market imperfections and reduced investment. In this section we briefly highlight a number of possible
implications for research and policy.
It would be desirable to obtain a more comprehensive measure of asset ownership in the economy to
explore the robustness of the results, identify potential  channels for the effect of inequality on growth, and
identify causal implications of changes in the distribution of wealth. Although inequality of assets is
likely to  be more stable intertemporally than the distribution of income, the assumption of it being
unchanged over a long time period may not correspond to reality. Following the lead of a number of
recent papers investigating changes in the asset distribution and their determinants, it would be useful to
proceed to a more complete empirical characterization of mobility in the income as well as the asset
distribution. By using micro-level data, this would allow to go beyond land and education to include a
broader array of key assets available and public services useful to poor households. This would facilitate a
better assessment of public policies aiming at increasing equality of opportunity, a better  measure of
changes in household welfare, and a and but also provide a better measure of household welfare that
includes other types of Comparing the impact of asset ownership on the well-being of the poor (and of
different strata within society) with the effect of increased access to public goods could, by exploring
interactions between the two, lead to important  policy conclusions.
If, as suggested by the above results, asset ownership is an important determinant of growth that can only
be imperfectly be substituted for by public investments, well-designed measures to redistribute assets
17should, at least in theory, allow countries to increase equity and efficiency at the same time. However,
historically, attempts at asset redistribution have rarely been an unqualified success. Indeed, in many
countries the  side-effects of redistributive policies have, by  undermining the functioning of markets,
reducing incentives for investment, and increasing social tension and polarization, probably done more
harm  than  good  - especially  since  many of  them  did  not strive  to  reduce the  extent  of  market
imperfections and facilitate sustainable asset accumulation by the poor. Research into mechanisms that
offer potential to increase the asset endowment of the poor, possibly starting with  past and  current
attempts at land reform, may have a high payoff not only to design interventions but, more importantly, to
gain a better understanding of the mechanisms and forces at work.
Even though more research is needed to elaborate on the impact of asset ownership on growth and the
channels through which such an impact comes about, our results point towards a number of direct policy
implications.
First, as a consequence of macro-economic liberalization and the need to constrain and focus the role of
the state in the economy on a number of well-defined areas, many developing country economies are
currently  undergoing major  structural  transformations that  have  the  potential  of  profoundly  and
permanently altering the distribution of assets. The presence of a link between asset distribution and
growth would suggest that special attention be warranted to prevent such policies (e.g. privatization) from
leading to a major worsening of inequality of asset ownership. 10 In addition to ensuring continuing and
possibly  better  targeted  government provision  of  key  public  goods,  emphasis  on  the  regulatory
framework, transparent processes of divestiture of state assets, and high levels of accountability, would
receive increased justification to prevent emergence of wealth concentration that might be difficult to
reverse thereafter.
Second, well-known imperfections in insurance markets normally expose poor people in developing
countries to high levels of risk and volatility. Safety net policies to prevent potentially irreversible loss of
assets in case of macro-economic  or localized crises may have an important role as a complement to more
informal mechanisms of insurance. This is especially in view of the fact that a minimum level of asset
ownership can provide the scope for considerable self-insurance  against idiosyncratic risk and nutritional
crises.
Finally, our results highlight the importance of human capital as a growth-enhancing asset, supporting
policy-makers' emphasis on education as one instrument to overcome inequality. However, the negative
interaction between education and asset ownership also suggests that educational expansion alone may
18not be sufficient to achieve the social transformation needed as a basis for sustainable development.
Innovative programs to foster the acquisition of productive assets could be of great importance, especially
if they  increase investment incentives and help the poor utilize their labor in a more productive way
(Putterman, Roemer, and Silvestre 1998). More research in the design as well as the economic returns and
political feasibility of such programs, and in particular their scope to replace recurrent transfers, would be
desirable.
0 Data on indicating a significant worsening of  income inequality (by more than 20 points in Russia and Ukraine, for example) in a large number
of transition economies (Milanovicl998;Kanbur and Lustig 1999) suggest that, even if there is no one-to one correspondence between income
and asset distribution, such concems may not be unfounded.
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22Table  1:  Descriptive  statistics  by  major  regions
5-year  Periods
1966-70  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90
East  Asia  & Pacific  Observations  9  9  9  9  9
Gdp  / capita  3554.07  4308.22  4816.67  5460.29  6230.52
Investment  rate  18.68  21.18  22.79  23.65  23.90
Human  capital  / cap.  4.88  5.33  5.86  6.42  6.81
Land  Gini  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56
Income  Gini  37.26  38.89  38.53  38.60  40.04
Latin  America  Observations  17  17  17  17  17
Gdp  / capita  2799.40  3213.91  3587.54  3505.84  3520.17
Investment  rate  16.79  18.70  19.44  15.39  14.20
Human  capital  / cap.  4.23  4.66  5.16  5.75  6.17
Land  Gini  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.81
Income  Gini  57.24  50.93  49.77  49.06  50.16
Mid-East  & N.  Africa  Observations  6  6  6  6  6
Gdp  / capita  2932.57  3755.43  4391.93  4150.70  3980.92
Investment  rate  13.48  15.38  17.49  17.80  14.36
Human  capital  / cap.  2.31  2.98  3.74  4.42  4.89
Land  Gini  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67
Income  Gini  43.67  41.65  41.90  42.95  38.17
North  America  Observations  2  2  2  2  2
Gdp  / capita  11114.80  12720.90  14346.60  15145.70  17247.90
Investment  rate  22.57  22.88  23.74  23.14  25.12
Human  capital/cap.  9.64  9.75  10.03  10.41  10.76
Land  Gini  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64
Income  Gini  35.61  35.28  35.91  35.12  36.54
South  Asia  Observations  4  4  4  4  4
Gdp/capita  1014.45  972.65  1094.55  1287.20  1474.65
Investment  rate  8.60  8.19  9.82  10.18  10.06
Human  capital/cap.  2.53  2.85  3.15  3.48  3.72
Land  Gini  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56
Income  Gini  33.30  33.32  35.37  36.68  33.57
Sub-Sah.  Africa  Observations  7  7  7  7  7
Gdp  / capita  838.20  894.31  947.91  889.80  822.48
Investment  rate  7.36  7.83  8.03  6.50  6.27
Human  capital  / cap.  1.11  1.40  1.74  2.14  2.50
Land  Gini  0.61  0.61  0.61  0.61  0.61
Income  Gini  39.00  44.00  41.21  35.75
Westem  Europe  Observations  15  15  15  15  15
Gdp/capita  7135.32  8525.07  9449.48  10130.35  11483.41
Investment  rate  26.35  27.77  26.05  23.17  24.34
Human  capital/cap.  7.20  7.40  7.62  7.92  8.19
Land  Gini  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57
Income  Gini  37.09  34.88  30.82  29.74  30.83
Total  Observations  60  60  60  60  60
Gdp  / capita  3939.27  4656.86  5202.31  5454.50  5970.10
Investment  rate  17.68  19.18  19.57  17.69  17.37
Human  capital  / cap.  4.58  4.95  5.37  5.84  6.20
Land  Gini  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.65
Income  Gini  40.63  39.32  38.51  36.91  38.58
23Table  2: Descriptive  statistics  by country
Country  GDP  per  capita  Human  capital  Investment  Income  Gini  Land  Gini
Initial  Final  Initial  Final  Initial  Final  Initial  Final
ARG  5256  5261  5.94  7.53  15.66  13.80.  . 85.62
AUS  9951  14343  6.07  7.55  29.16  26.50  32.02  38.67  85.31
AUT  6910  11929  8.78  8.71  24.86  25.30.  23.05  68.81
BGD  1162  1315  2.36  3.11  5.90  2.82  34.2  32.93  41.87
BOL  1517  1667  3.37  6.24  20.24  5.06.  42.04  76.77
BRA  2139  4226  2.66  4.36  18.20  16.76  57.61  56.77  84.10
CAN  9601  16917  8.59  9.95  22.60  27.12  31.855  30.33  55.15
CHE  11972  15883  6.46  6.91  28.28  32.84.  . 50.01
CIV  1487  1409  0.43  2.05  9.48  5.68.  38.51  42.29
COL  1987  3206  2.99  4.97  15.42  14.38  52.02  51.20  82.93
CRI  2692  3381  5.44  7.81  13.12  19.06.  44.04  80.63
CYP  3396  7409  6.58  7.65  28.80  24.04.  . 62.00
DEU  8541  13498  8.51  8.43  28.70  23.80  33.57  28.10  55.39
DNK  9127  13613  8.06  9.10  26.74  22.68.  33.15  43.02
ECU  1818  2805  3.61  5.66  20.14  18.22  . . 83.99
EGY  1075  1906  3.08  4.74  2.88  5.06.  . 54.90
ESP  5357  8738  5.61  7.09  26.36  26.04.  26.92  84.46
FIN  7103  13331  7.48  9.74  34.72  31.88  31.8  23.59  49.42
FRA  8357  13211  7.80  8.45  27.52  26.14  44  30.90  54.40
GBR  8173  12687  9.42  10.16  18.84  19.14  24.78  31.24  67.73
GRC  3639  6498  7.33  8.70  26.00  18.04.  35.19  45.43
GTM  1903  2106  2.39  3.49  8.28  7.58.  58.66  85.34
HND  1190  1401  2.70  4.41  14.76  12.28  61.88  54.31  76.50
IDN  654  1784  2.33  4.35  8.66  27.54  31.7  32.55  55.47
IND  727  1184  1.86  3.50  13.00  14.74  31.064  31.07  61.42
IRN  4075  3370  1.30  3.74  17.50  19.78  43.665  . 62.30
IRQ  4352  3496  1.56  4.08  6.20  19.85.  . 72.61
ISR  5170  8985  3.57  7.11  25.60  18.86.  . 80.05
ITA  6789  11845  6.63  7.83  28.48  24.24  . 33.97  74.30
JAM  2432  2409  6.48  7.99  28.92  15.30  . 42.83  80.29
JOR  1624  3372  2.21  4.88  9.80  12.36.  36.10  67.65
JPN  6079  13124  10.46  10.98  32.66  35.22  35.3  36.30  43.20
KEN  667  893  1.87  4.07  16.38  11.54  . . 74.95
KOR  1370  5615  4.14  7.61  19.48  32.12  31.9325  33.64  33.85
LKA  1216  2050  4.67  6.21  6.08  12.74  37.71  38.40  65.73
MDG  1121  696  1.98  3.44  1.32  1.82  . . 80.40
MEX  3730  5457  3.77  5.85  15.88  14.50  57.7  54.98  60.66
MLI  417  537  0.20  1.10  6.16  7.14.  . 47.76
MMR  400  547  1.32  2.55  7.76  7.20.  . 44.03
MYS  1845  4365  3.55  6.13  17.42  27.24  50  48.35  64.01
NLD  8326  12272  8.04  8.39  27.66  22.42  . 29.42  50.46
NOR  7687  14740  8.61  9.45  31.48  29.78  36.04  23.40  39.14
NZL  8993  11634  6.36  8.76  22.74  24.14.  37.19  76.41
PAK  952  1350  1.25  2.08  9.42  9.94  30.235  31.90  55.59
PAN  2336  3111  5.00  7.40  21.32  12.34  57  56.47  80.40
PER  2644  2606  4.08  6.49  15.56  17.30  . 42.76  92.30
PHL  1345  1662  5.53  7.67  12.88  14.82.  45.73  56.00
PRT  2870  6203  4.06  5.65  22.52  17.98  . 36.76  71.81
PRY  1344  2041  5.38  5.79  8.64  18.02.  . 85.69
SEN  1126  1156  0.53  1.97  4.84  4.06  . . 49.27
SLV  1832  1825  2.96  4.92  6.94  7.68 . . 82.11
SWE  10082  14341  8.79  9.81  24.48  22.98  33.4097  31.89  45.64
THA  1349  3002  4.18  5.68  17.40  20.30  42.63  47.87  42.55
TUN  1299  2756  2.12  4.76  18.92  10.22.  40.24  64.56
TUR  2096  3462  2.48  4.44  18.58  21.80  56  44.09  59.45
TZA  409  537  0.81  2.40  9.92  11.80  39 . 78.99
UGA  641  529  1.92  2.49  3.42  1.82.  33.00  54.88
URY  3855  4610  5.23  7.83  8.70  10.62.  . 81.30
USA  12629  17579  10.69  11.57  22.54  23.12  39.36  42.74  73.10
VEN  7520  6321  3.32  6.51  24.88  14.54  . 47.70  91.70
24Table 3: Results of growth equation  estimation, large sample
Equation 1  Equation  2  Equation 3
Lagged GDP (log)  -0.1118  0.0141  -0.4821  0.2885  0.1543  -0.5504  0.2165  0.0803  -0.5611
0.0406  0.0345  0.0454  0.0496  0.0230  0.0814  0.0423  0.0223  0.0828
Human capital (log)  0.1039  -0.0088  0.1072  1.1511  0.6628  -0.1724  0.9203  0.3036  -0.1017
0.0400  0.0380  0.0474  0.2197  0.0836  0.2802  0.1713  0.0663  0.2972
Human  cap. GDP  -0.1607  -0.0889  0.0399  -0.0971  -0.0472  0.0476
0.0290  0.0115  0.0395  0.0223  0.0112  0.0409
Human  cap. Land Gini  -0.0047  0.0009  -0.0021
0.0014  0.0008  0.0029
Land Gini  -0.0111  -0.0032  -0.0065  -0.0060  0.0020  -0.0036
0.0029  0.0014  0.0018  0.0006  0.0020  0.0014
Intercept  1.5568  0.2142  -1.5000  -0.6221  -1.4661  -0.2653
0.3884  0.2951  0.3824  0.1440  0.2966  0.1176
Hausman test  109.70  934.83  17.50  199.17  29.78  185.08
No of countries  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at 5% level
Figures below the coefficient estimates are standard errors
25Table 4: Results of growth equation  estimation, small sample
Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3
Lagged  GDP (log)  -0.1887  -0.0573  -0.4170  -0.0529  0.2841  -0.3381  -0.1100  -0.1730  -0.6392
0.0341  0.0171  0.0647  0.0465  0.0351  0.1614  0.0524  0.0170  0.1714
Human capital (log)  0.2738  -0.0471  0.2246  0.5571  1.2223  0.5131  0.4187  0.3589  1.2213
0.0514  0.0256  0.1155  0.2257  0.1631  0.5524  0.1793  0.0829  0.5527
Human  cap. GDP  -0.0454  -0.1650  -0.0398  -0.0116  0.0163  0.0659
0.0270  0.0201  0.0745  0.0251  0.0103  0.0755
Human  cap. Land Gini  -0.0021  -0.0050  -0.0222
0.0019  0.0007  0.0059
Income Gini  0.0017  -0.0035  0.0033  0.0041  -0.0057  0.0033  0.0046  0.0009  0.0032
0.0021  0.0010  0.0023  0.0016  0.0009  0.0023  0.0010  0.0006  0.0022
Land Gini  -0.0049  -0.0040  -0.0041  -0.0053  -0.0001  0.0095
0.0010  0.0004  0.0007  0.0003  0.0035  0.0014
Intercept  1.4750  1.0801  0.3879  -1.3790  0.5634  0.6595
0.2694  0.1397  0.3373  0.2572  0.3089  0.1266
Hausman  test  36.49  28.63  820.80  31.10  60.84  49.47
No of countries  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at 5% level
Figures  below the coefficient estimates are standard errors
26Table 5: Results of growth equation estimation  with investment, large sample
Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3
Lagged GDP (log)  0.1128  0.0971  -0.5386  0.1750  0.0157  -0.5491  0.1371  0.0028  -0.5503
0.0510  0.0214  0.0856  0.0552  0.0193  0.0868  0.0466  0.0156  0.0870
Lagged Investment  (log)  0.0892  0.0859  -0.0161  0.0216  0.0993  -0.0167  0.1608  0.0548  0.0113
0.0215  0.0104  0.0358  0.0264  0.0087  0.0359  0.0454  0.0154  0.0643
Human capital (log)  0.6053  0.5774  -0.1548  0.9292  0.2611  -0.0824  0.7953  0.2680  -0.0941
0.2047  0.0745  0.2833  0.2368  0.0626  0.3005  0.1956  0.0583  0.3016
Human cap. GDP  -0.0859  -0.0772  0.0374  -0.0878  -0.0400  0.0450  -0.0498  -0.0475  0.0514
0.0271  0.0102  0.0399  0.0268  0.0093  0.0413  0.0235  0.0088  0.0431
Human cap. Investment  -0.1038  0.0449  -0.0232
0.0351  0.0156  0.0441
Human cap. Land Gini  -0.0059  0.0010  -0.0021  -0.0043  0.0004  -0.0019
0.0018  0.0006  0.0029  0.0014  0.0005  0.0030
Land Gini  -0.0030  -0.0039  0.0026  -0.0031  0.0003  -0.0017
0.0015  0.0005  0.0022  0.0011  0.0017  0.0010
Intercept  -0.6753  -0.5564  -1.2519  -0.0811  -1.1567  -0.0004
0.2998  0.1261  0.3801  0.1181  0.3259  0.1030
Hausman test  71.34  160.28  195.61  202.27  97.12  174.48
No of countries  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at 5% level
Figures below the coefficient estimates are standard  errors
27Table 6: Results of investment equation  estimation
Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4
Lagged  investment  0.6985  0.9376  0.0380  1.1980  1.1565  0.1130  0.2074  0.8467  -0.0725  0.1010  0.9863  -0.2030
0.1091  0.0464  0.0589  0.0869  0.0409  0.1074  0.0751  0.0411  0.0920  0.0803  0.0314  0.0957
Human  capital (log)  0.0371  0.0128  0.0557  0.9065  0.4410  0.1177  0.2235  0.0463  0.3178  0.6871  -0.2999  2.2070
0.0570  0.0324  0.0768  0.3034  0.0825  0.3182  0.0442  0.0189  0.1464  0.3183  0.0806  0.5714
Human  cap. Investment  -0.2271  -0.1886  -0.0585
0.0883  0.0311  0.0700
Human cap. Land Gini  -0.0058  0.0016  0.0010  -0.0066  0.0048  -0.0298
0.0028  0.0011  0.0051  0.0048  0.0013  0.0087
Income Gini  -0.0060  0.0063  -0.0027  0.0055  0.0067
0.0034  0.0010  0.0037  0.0009  0.0034
Land Gini  0.0282  -0.0022  0.0032  -0.0049  -0.0038  -0.0039  0.0100  -0.0121
0.0165  0.0023  0.0036  0.0019  0.0018  0.0007  0.0080  0.0025
Intercept  -1.0570  0.3123  -0.5216  -0.0682  2.4954  0.4116  1.7484  0.6300
0.9281  0.2055  0.2319  0.1044  0.2829  0.1151  0.5251  0.1514
Hausman  test  0.00  6.34  40.43  0.00  24.65  272.64  0.00  129.93  26.51  0.00  198.87  -15.77
No of countries  60  60  60  60  60  60  31  31  31  31  31  31
Note: Bold coefficients are significant  at 5% level
Figures  below the coefficient  estimates are standard errors
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